

UN Constabulary Forces Case Neg

INHERENCY

- 1 Bush doing CF now
- 2-5 CIVPOL good

LINKS

- 6 T--peacekeeping
- 7 Private PKOs CP
- 8-9 Spending/Readiness DAs
- 10 Civil-Military Relations (CMR)

POLITICS

- 11 Plan popular with Congress
- 12-3 Plan unpopular with Congress
- 14 Plan requires Congressional action
- 15 Plan popular with public
- 16 Plan unpopular with public
- 17 Public opinion key to agenda (fopo)

SOLVENCY TURNS

- 18 UN PKOs cause escalation
- 19 PKOs spread AIDS

UN PKOs/CONSTABULARY FORCE FAILS:

- 20-22 General
- 23-25 No political will
- 26-27 Doctrinal problems
- 28 Too slow
- 29 UNHQ problems
- 30 No funding
- 31 No standardized equipment
- 32 No chain of command
- 33 Institutional changes to UN fail
- 34 Peacemaking must come first
- 35 No communication
- 36 No transportation
- 37-41 Logistical problems
- 42 Need courts/prisons
- 43 Domestic constraints
- 44 Civilian/military incompatibility
- 45 Can't effectively fight
- 46 Attacks on PKOs
- 47 DDR fails
- 48 Need CIVPOL
- 49 No UNSC enforcement
- 50 Media coverage

UN PKOs/CONSTABULARY FORCE FAILS (CONTINUED):

- 51 Military culture
- 52 No rule of law definition
- 53 ICC blocks solvency
- 54-58 Brahimi report bad

OTHER

- 59 A2: Haiti advantage
- 60 A2: Terrorism impacts

NEG
CONSTABULARY FORCES

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Bush supporting (know)
Vi

Bush is supporting Constabulary Force Now

BUSH IS WORKING TO DEVELOP A CONSTABULARY FORCE NOW

GANTZ 2004. (COORD OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE PEACE OPERATIONS, JUN 7, WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG)

Rule of law operations are critical to restoring basic public safety and maintaining law and order, which in turn allows other political and economic reconstruction efforts to go forward. To conduct rule of law operations, the UN relies upon civilian police, as well as judicial officials such as judges, prosecutors, and corrections staff, contributed individually from member states. A key problem is that in the immediate post-conflict environment, a special sort of police capacity is needed. Widespread looting and rioting, organized crime, and extremist activities such as terrorism require a response that falls between the overwhelming force doctrine of the military and the community policing techniques of ordinary police.

As described in detail in RI's recent bulletin, European Constabulary Police Needed to Improve UN Peace Operations, constabulary police, found in European states such as France, Spain, and Italy, can fill this need in peace operations. Constabulary forces receive both police and military training, and can deploy as formed units with their own communications, logistical support, and command structures already in place. They are trained to deal with situations that might overwhelm ordinary police, but are not a job for combat soldiers. Constabulary police are only found in certain countries, however, and the need for well-qualified professional constabulary police further limits the pool of available officers. For this reason, the Bush administration's plan to work with European allies to enhance constabulary police capacity is crucial to making peace operations more effective, and should be supported.

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NEG
CONSTABULARY FORCES ARE

Civ Pol
Good 1/4

Civilian Police good 1/4

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CIVILIAN POLICE ARE BETTER THAN MILITARY IN POSTCONFLICT SITUATIONS

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 87)

←The increased use of international police in peace operations results from their ability to contribute to public security in the short term, while helping to build law-enforcement and judicial institutions that are critical for long-term stability. During the process of state fragmentation, the police may be swept away, or they may mutate into predators that engage in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, robberies, and other criminal activities. Police are likely to identify with the existing regime and to perform an increasingly politicized role, leading to abuse of power and the brutalizing of regime opponents. When the international community intervenes in states in crisis, it is critical that the intervention force is capable of effectively performing police functions. In peace operations, international civilian police have proven better trained and more able than the military to handle such essential functions as monitoring local police forces, controlling crime, handling demonstrations and civil disorder, escorting refugees, and providing election security. CIVPOL missions are much less expensive than military operations. The long-term presence of foreign police is often more acceptable to host governments and citizens than foreign military forces. There is an emerging consensus that international police forces offer an effective solution in financial and political terms to the problems of rebuilding post-conflict societies.¹⁴ >

2

CONSTABULARY FORCES AFF

Civ Pol
Good 2/4

Civilian Police Good

2/4

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CIVILIAN POLICE WORK – KOSOVO PROVES

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 327)

As for civil police, the results of the experiment with international executive policing in Kosovo have been promising. At the outset, many observers warned that international police could not perform the full range of police functions in a peace operation because they would be unfamiliar with the local language, culture, and legal system. In fact, over time, the UNMIK police have proven effective in controlling crime, ensuring public safety, and providing police services. They have also demonstrated, in cooperation with the Kosovo Police School and police trainers from the OSCE, the ability to develop an effective indigenous police force. In the past year, the UNMIK police have provided Kosovo with comprehensive police services, including effective intelligence collection and a crackdown on organized crime. >327

CIVILIAN POLICE LEAD TO NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS

LEWIS, MARKS, AND PERITO 02 (William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito-
National Security Council: Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations.
"American Civilian Police in UN peace Operations: Lessons learned and Ideas for the Future."
<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html> April 22, 2002)

CIVPOL's best contribution to that goal comes not through serving as a long-term law enforcement surrogate, but in supporting the development of a new criminal justice system that has the trust and confidence of the entire population. Long-term engagement should come in the form of training and support, along with quantitative and qualitative evaluation of new police services. Such assessment would be backed by the kind of executive authority necessary to address institutional and personnel problems and concretely manage the development of democratic police and criminal justice institutions.

3

CONSTABULARY FORCES AFF

Civ Pol
Good 2/4

Civilian Police Good

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3/4

POLICE ARE VASTLY MORE SKILLED AND COMPETENT THAN REGULAR SOLDIERS.

BRONSON, RACHEAL (OLIN SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. *When Soldiers Become Cops*)

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fa/fa_novdec02.html

DECEMBER, 2002

In addition to fixing the civilian policy instruments in Washington, the Pentagon should redefine the role of its military police (MPS) and bolster civil affairs. The Army's civil affairs units establish relationships between the U.S. military and local civilian authorities. They provide the link between troops on the ground and larger political — interests. Similarly, MPS have the kind of skills that are often needed to keep the peace in conflict spots. These talents include knowing how to respond to civil disturbances in populated areas, how to interact with civilian leaders, and what force options exist when trying to restore law and order. American MPS train to “set up roadblocks, cordon off areas, disperse crowds, release riot control agents, and serve as security forces or reserves.” Unlike elite combat forces, moreover, the training MPS receive explicitly emphasizes the principle of “minimum necessary force.” It is no surprise, therefore, that in places such as Kosovo where combat troops have often felt frustrated with their assigned mission, American MPS have reportedly been much more content.

Of course, directing American MPS to assume new responsibilities would fundamentally alter their institutional orientation. MPS currently do most of their work within the U.S. military, policing U.S. forces and securing lines of passage. They also act in support of U.S. police at home. But if Washington truly wants to improve the military's capacity to handle policing abroad and to relieve the strain on its war fighters, it should start by rethinking the size, responsibilities, and jurisdiction of the military police and their relationship to other forces.

HARMS: LACK OF ORDER STEMS FROM LACK OF CIVILIAN POLICE.

United States Institute of Peace (BUILDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY FOR U.S. STABILITY OPERATIONS)

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialsreports/sr118.html>

APRIL, 2004

One reason for this gap is the total absence of any U.S. civilian capacity to deploy organized units of police with specialized equipment necessary to perform crucial public order functions such as crowd control and the curbing of rampant lawlessness. Also contributing to this gap is the protracted delay involved in mobilizing individual police and other personnel to perform the full spectrum of functions, from intelligence to incarceration, required to foster the rule of law. Standard international responses to this public security gap—essentially mobilizing individual civil police (CIVPOL) and other law enforcement and judicial personnel—suffer from protracted delays and missing capabilities. Efforts to reconstitute local capacity are likely to take years.

4

CONSTABULARY FORCES AFF

Civ Pol
Good 4/4

Civilian Police Good 4/4

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CIVPOL SUPPORTS FAIR ELECTIONS

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 89)

During many peace operations, international police played an important role by assisting with the conduct of free and fair elections. This involved helping to guarantee a neutral and secure environment and to guard against intimidation and interference in the electoral process. International police escorted candidates, supervised election rallies, accompanied election monitors, protected polling stations, and ensured the integrity of ballot boxes. These tasks were performed in support of UN election officials and representatives of nongovernmental organizations.¹⁹

While international police...

THE U.S. CIVPOL IS HIGHLY DISTINGUISHED

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 92)

Despite these obstacles, American CIVPOL officers have compiled a record of distinguished service. American police are well educated, trained, and experienced. Among their UN colleagues, they enjoy a reputation for professionalism and are looked to for leadership and technical expertise. There have been cases, however, where the United States has sent officers who were less than fit for strenuous duty. There have also been incidents of American officers returned to the United States for various types of misconduct. Three American CIVPOL officers were killed in the line of duty. All three died in a helicopter accident in Bosnia in 1997 that was the result of poor weather conditions.²⁷

5

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

1 of 1
① Peacekeeping

① Peacekeeping

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RAPID RESPONSE IS NOT PEACEKEEPING

URQUHART 1998 [BRIAN, FORMER UNDER-SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW
CENTURY, PG. 192]

A rapid-response group will not take the place of traditional peace-keeping forces, and it should be relieved as soon as possible by normal peacekeeping arrangements, should that be necessary. It will certainly not take the place of enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Its main purpose would be to allow the United Nations to make an immediate practical response to conflict or potential conflict at a point where quite a small effort might achieve disproportionately large results. The rapid-response group would stay in an area of operations for the shortest practicable time—either until the acute phase of the crisis is over or until the group is relieved by a regular peacekeeping operation.

6

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Private
PKO (CP)
1/1

Private PKO's (CP)

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AS POLICY MAKERS BREACH THE DILEMMA OF PKOs MANY SUGGEST PRIVATE SECTOR TROOPS

GANTZ 2003. (COORD OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE PEACE OPERATIONS, NOV.
18, WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG)

As policymakers confront this dilemma, some individuals have proposed a controversial solution: using private contractors in peace operations. If nations with first class militaries refuse to put their troops in harm's way in remote locations, and if the UN is saddled with troops from developing nations that are not up to the task, then perhaps the UN should hire the private sector to save the day. This idea has appeal because it promises a rapid response to protect victims of systematic, large-scale violence.

Proponents suggest the private sector might play a constructive role in two ways. First, the organization in charge of a peacekeeping operation could hire a private company to buttress or augment capacity that otherwise would be provided by troops from contributing nations. For instance, various firms have the capacity to provide logistical support, such as troop and equipment transport, aerial surveillance operation, communications gear, and technology for intelligence gathering, which would substantially upgrade the capacity and overall effectiveness of troops from developing countries. Or, a company might be hired to provide training services to the militaries of developing countries, enhancing their capacity to provide effective troops to UN operations.

The second way the private sector could play a role in peace operations is more far-reaching. The UN, or possibly another interested third party, would hire a private military company (PMC) to recruit and deploy troops for an entire peace operation. The PMC would hire soldiers, deploy them to a conflict zone, defeat any spoilers to the peace process, and then presumably hand over the operation to a follow-on force of the more traditional sort, provided perhaps by the UN. Alternatively, a PMC could provide a rapid reaction combat force that would deal with spoilers that regular peacekeepers either could not or would not (for domestic political reasons) be able to deal with.

7

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

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spending
Rdms 4 1/2 Spending/Readiness 4 to Constab. Force

CONSTABULARY FORCES ARE COSTLY

LEWIS, MARKS, AND PERITO 02 (William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito- National Security Council:Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. "Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations." <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html> April 22, 2002)

[While the Brahimi Report is comprehensive, one participant pointed out it was instructive to look at some "roads not taken" by the panel (that is, ideas raised but set aside for various reasons). One suggestion was to create a standing unit of 500 CIVPOL officers who would be available for immediate deployment in a peace operation. The idea was set aside as too costly. Another suggestion was to routinely include Special Police Units in all CIVPOL missions to ensure appropriate forces for handling civil unrest. This concept was toned down and the specific reference to Special Units removed. A larger, standing UN law enforcement reserve for rapid deployment to post-conflict settings was not considered. Although such a capacity might not invite the same level of political opposition as a standing international military force, it would need to be big enough to take over public security duties in post-conflict situations, which would have made it very costly.]

BOSNIA SHOWS THAT CONSTABULARY FORCES ARE INEFFICIENT

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING, WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?: AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY FORCE, 226)

While the appearance of trained and properly equipped riot control police was enough to dissuade the demonstrators, this first use of the SPU for crowd control brought out several of its shortcomings. The first difficulty involved communication, as individual members of the SPUs were not required to demonstrate proficiency in English, the mission language. The first members of the Jordanian SPU to arrive on the scene could not speak English and could not communicate with other UNMIK police who were attempting to control the situation. To address the problem, UNMIK police had to find Arabic-speaking CIVPOL who also spoke English to act as liaison officers and interpreters for the SPU officers. The second problem involved command and control of the elements below the company level. The first SPU element on the scene arrived by armored vehicle without a senior officer present. As there was no one to command them to deploy, the officers stayed in their vehicle, ignoring the mayhem that was taking place around them, until a sufficiently senior officer arrived to order them to disembark. 78

8

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Spending
Reins 5/2

Spending/Readiness 6/ to Constab.
Force

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CONSTABULARY FORCES WILL BE BOGGED DOWN FOR YEARS
FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

First, there is a danger that an international constabulary might become or supplant the civilian police. Over the last 15 years, several countries have descended into complete domestic chaos with no legitimate, acknowledged, actual or effective government to administer local laws or preserve the peace. This was the case in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia during the 1990s where thugs, warlords and criminal gangs operated almost with impunity. In the absence of any local order, the possibility of the UN constabulary being bogged down for a very long period while civil order is restored is very great and very real.

IT IS INEFFICIENT AND EXPENSIVE TO SUBJECT U.S. SOLDIERS TO REBUILDING AND CONSTABLING.

BRONSON, RACHEAL (OLIN SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. *When Soldiers Become Cops*)

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fa/fa_novdec02.html

DECEMBER, 2002

As violence in Afghanistan continues to simmer, the stabilizing role of American troops there looks increasingly necessary. Even many members of the Bush administration – which long resisted expanding the U.S. troop presence beyond Kabul and rejected anything that smacked of “nation building” – now recognize how important U.S. soldiers are for Afghanistan. At the same time, however, it is also becoming evident that the U.S. military is not very well suited to the task of establishing security in precarious political environments. Because the United States has no paramilitary units and only poorly organized civilian policing tools, elite combat forces have ended up filling the void. This approach has been inefficient and expensive and has reduced Washington’s ability to project power. And it has all but ensured that the U.S. military will bog down in Afghanistan – not because of mission creep or poor civilian oversight, but because military and civilian leaders have yet to fully accept that a security-conscious nation-building plan is a necessary component of an effective exit strategy.

9

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

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CF CMB ①'s
1/1

Constabulary Force Civil Military Relations Links

ARMY OPPOSES CONSTABULARY FORCE

KITFIELD 2001 (JAMES, CORRESPONDENT FOR GOVEXEC MAGAZINE, THE PEACEKEEPERS, ONLINE, A/P= <http://WWW.GOVEXEC.COM/FEATURES/0301/0301S4.HTM>)

Service leaders say creating a separate peacekeeping force would drain scarce resources and weaken force structure. After a decade of experience, military leaders also believe that with the proper training and preparation, combat troops can effectively become peacekeepers. The combat prowess of U.S. forces is also seen as a critical deterrent to potential adversaries in peacekeeping situations.

DOD OPPOSES PKO'S

CSBA 1999 (MARCH 22 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS INDEPENDENT PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ESTABLISHED TO PROMOTE INNOVATIVE THINKING, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/U.19990322.Potential_Cost_Of_U.19990322.Potential_Cost_Of_.htm)

Over the past several years, DoD has become increasingly concerned that U.S. participation in peacekeeping and other contingency operations is reducing the readiness of the U.S. military to carry out more traditional military missions. However, just how serious the effects have been is far from clear.

US army opposes professional peacekeeping roles

LA Times, 6/27/2003

Army leaders historically have been skeptical of turning any of their professional fighters into professional peacekeepers, and have publicly opposed such plans. In recent years, the U.S. role in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Croatia has become primarily the province of the National Guard and the reserves. "In their heart of hearts, they feel very strongly that they don't want to be peacekeepers, and who can blame them, because war fighting is what they do, and we need to be very careful before we have them not doing that," said Nash, the retired general. "Armies see themselves when they get up in the morning as war fighters. When you get the Army doing lots of other things, you have a bad army." Said a current Army official: "Is there any unit of the U.S. Army that wants to be 'Peacekeepers-R-Us?' Not exactly."

10

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Plan is pop.
w/ Congress
(4/1)

Plan is Popular with Congress

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GDI

REPUBLICANS LIKE THE IDEA OF A CONSTABULARY FORCE.

BRONSON, RACHEAL (OLIN SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. *When Soldiers Become Cops*)

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fa/fa_novdec02.html

DECEMBER, 2002

To be fair, several key figures in the Bush administration do seem to understand the harm that is caused to the U.S. military by the failure to build civilian or paramilitary capabilities for peacekeeping and policing. During the 2000 presidential campaign, soon-to-be National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice argued that "we need to think hard about the development of forces that are appropriate to police functions." Colin Powell, now secretary of state, echoed,

We're going to make on-the-ground assessments [in the Balkans] of what we're doing now, what's needed now, but also, what is really going to be needed in the future and see if we can find ways [to make peacekeeping and policing] less of a burden on our armed forces, not as a way of running out but as a way of substituting others or ... other kinds of organizations and units and perhaps police organizations to handle the remaining missions.

Bipart support for UN constabulary forces (even ole Ronny Reagan)

Adam Garfinkle, 9/22/2001, ORBIS, No. 4, vol. 45

Also unwise is for the United States to lead every effort at prevention and amelioration by itself. In this regard, the establishment of a U.N. constabulary force, under the aegis of the Security Council, is not an outlandish idea. Indeed, it has garnered support not only from liberals, but also from the likes of Edward Luttwak, William F. Buckley, and Ronald Reagan. [19] In 1993, a bipartisan federal commission on improving the effectiveness of the United Nations also recommended a U.N. rapid-reaction "legion" as an element of preventive diplomacy. [20] As a number of studies have pointed out, that notion does have its strict limitations. [21] If any permanent Security Council member opposes its use, the force will not be employed. If it runs into serious combat, its standing capabilities may quickly prove inadequate and even embarrassing. Indeed, the record of such forces to date is poor: they have taken too long to muster and have not fared well once in place. But their performance can improve, and in those instances where the major powers are in agreement and where local antagonists want external help, such a force can be an economical solution.



CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

plan Un-pop
w/ congress
1 of 2

Plan Unpopular w/ congress

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POLITX LYNK - CONSTABULARY FORCE IS CONTROVERSIAL IN CONGRESS
KITFIELD 2001 (JAMES, CORRESPONDENT FOR GOVEXEC MAGAZINE, THE PEACEKEEPERS,
ONLINE, A/P= <http://WWW.GOVEXEC.COM/FEATURES/0301/0301S4.HTM>)

The U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century, an independent panel created by Congress in 1999 and co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, also sparked debate about the potential need for such a specialized force. In its April 2000 report, the commission said that because such "stability" operations are likely to increase in the future, the military needs rapidly deployable units capable of assuming humanitarian relief and constabulary duties. The commission did not explicitly propose creating a separate peacekeeping force, but even the suggestion that the military should focus more on such operations drew the ire of conservatives in Congress. "I fundamentally disagree with those who advocate shifting the composition of our armed forces toward peacekeeping and humanitarian operations at the expense of warfighting capabilities," said Rep. Floyd Spence, R-S.C., former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in a letter to the Hart-Rudman Commission.

12

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Plan Un-pop
w/ congress
2 of 2

Plan Unpopular w/ congress

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CIVILIAN POLICE PROGRAM UNPOPULAR IN CONGRESS

LEWIS, MARKS, AND PERITO 02 (William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito- National Security Council:Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. "*Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations.*" <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html> April 22, 2002)

< Of greater significance is the fact that the U.S. CIVPOL program lacks statutory authorization and is funded on an annual basis. It has little congressional support and has received limited White House attention. Alone among donor nations, the United States recruits its CIVPOL contingents through a commercial contractor. Most American CIVPOL are mid-career

officers from state and local police departments who take a leave of absence, resign, or have recently retired. Earlier in the program, reliance on retired officers had produced highly uneven results. Participants noted recent press reports alleging that Americans were among CIVPOL officers in Bosnia who frequented brothels and were involved in trafficking in women. A few participants argued that providing police for international missions was an inherently governmental function and it was inappropriate for the United States to work through a contractor. Other participants believed there was nothing wrong with using a commercial contractor, but thought the current system could be made to work better.>

13

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

congress K-10
① 1/1

Plan requires Congress Action

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UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY FORCE WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

LEWIS, MARKS, AND PERITO 02 (William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito- National Security Council:Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. "*Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations.*" <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html> April 22, 2002)

There has also been little progress in the area of civil disorder management during peace operations. Special Police Units, which are part of the UN police force in Kosovo, have this capability, but have been used for other purposes. Participants noted the potential importance of constabulary units in controlling civil unrest and providing area security. Questions remain about the most appropriate models for such forces, whether they should be under military or civilian authority and how they should be employed. The United States has no constabulary forces and any effort to create them would require congressional action. Participants noted that the National Guard is trained in crowd control techniques and that U.S. Military Police are also capable of dealing with civil disorder. Some participants suggested that additional study might prove productive, since the Europeans also appear interested in developing this capability. The European Union has announced plans to create a 5,000-man police force for peacekeeping that would include a 1,000-man rapid reaction force composed principally of constabulary.

14

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Plan
popular
1/1

Plan popular with public

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POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE U.N. IS HIGH

RUGGIE 1998. (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY, 228)

Support for the UN among the American public remains high—in 1995, according to a Republican polling firm, 69 percent of the public supported relying on UN forces to deal with conflicts that did not directly threaten the United States, compared with 17 percent in favor of unilateral US action (UNA-USA 1995). Schneider's analysis of the 1994 Chicago Council survey (1997: 27) found that "support for strengthening the United Nations as 'a very high foreign policy goal of the United States' was 51 percent, its highest level in 20 years," and the only significant internationalist indicator to rise. Moreover, "a majority supported US participation in international peace-keeping forces. Fewer than 1 in 5 said we should not take part" (ibid.). The public was split over whether the United States should accept a UN commander or insist on its own. Ironically, at 54 percent, the UN enjoyed higher approval ratings among the American public than any branch of the US government (UNA-USA 1995).

15

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Plan of Pop
w/ Pub

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Plan is NOT Popular with the Public

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PUBLIC OPPOSES INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

RUGGIE 1998. (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY, 205)

Second, unless it is counteracted, public opinion will reinforce this tendency. Drawing on the quadrennial foreign policy polls conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, William Schneider (1997: 27-28) finds that in the latest survey, conducted in October 1994, most measures of public support for American international engagement were at all-time lows since immediately after Vietnam—including "defending our allies' security" and "protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression." In a *Times Mirror* survey taken in June 1995, the view that the United States should "mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own" was rejected by just 51 percent of the public while 41 percent agreed. The highest level of agreement since the survey's inception in 1974.)

16

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Politics - Pub. opinion

1 of 1 ^{to} agenda Politics - Public opinion ^{to} agenda

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PUBLIC OPINION AFFECTS FOREIGN POLICY

RUGGIE 1998. (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY, 221)

The new consensus, in essence, has turned these propositions on their heads (see especially Page and Shapiro 1992). The public is no better informed than was previously assumed, but it is believed to manage its information efficiently. Foreign policy attitudes are highly stable, the new consensus holds, and change "in ways that are regular, predictable, and indeed generally sensible, given the values that citizens hold and the information made available to them" (Shapiro and Page 1994: 217). Moreover, attitudes are now believed to be highly structured. "The American public makes sharp distinctions among [foreign] policies, favoring some and opposing others. Moreover, these distinctions tend to be coherent and consistent with each other: they fall into regular patterns that make sense and that fit with an overall system of values" (ibid.: 218). Lastly, although precise specifications are few, it is now believed that public opinion does affect the making of foreign policy. Influence flows in both directions: Leaders use information about attitudes for the purpose of leading,

persuading, or manipulating the public" (ibid.: 232). And there is evidence that the public reciprocates, for example, at times to restrain extreme positions that political leaders may hold (Nincic 1992; Holsti 1992). In short, the recent literature depicts the public as being not much better informed but more rational—even wiser—than was previously believed.

17

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

PKOs → escalation

1 of 2

UN PKOs cause escalation

CAMPBELL

RUSSELL

SUNI - 04

GDI

UN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS LEAD TO AN ESCALLATION BY ALTERING POLITICAL EQUATIONS. DOYLE, MICHAEL (DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, *PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW CENTURY*, PG.1-11)

1998

The very act of intervention, even by the UN, can mobilize nationalist opposition against the foreign forces. In Somalia, according to some observers, UN intervention contributed to a significant growth of support for Aidid's Somali National Alliance. Aidid's supporters soon roundly condemned UN "colonialism."¹¹ The strategic balance is not static. Military intervention tilts two local balances, improving the military correlation of forces but often at the cost of undermining the more important political balance. 9

18

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

US PKOS =
AIDS

1/1

~~AMERICAN~~ PKOS → AIDS

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

AMERICAN PKO's CAN SPREAD HIV/AIDS

WIRTH, 1995 (TIMOTHY, PRESIDENT OF THE UN FOUNDATION & BETTER WORLD FUND, JULY, "US INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY ON HIV/AIDS" <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/environment/releases/9507.html>)

World-wide peacekeeping operations may pose a danger of spreading HIV, particularly as traditional developing-country suppliers of troops find it increasingly difficult to supply units that are free of HIV infection. The risk runs both ways; peacekeepers could both be a source of HIV infection to local populations and be infected by them, thus becoming a source of the infection when they return home. In combat situations, there may also be increased risk of HIV transmission among peacekeepers, and between them and local populations, through contact with HIV contaminated blood.

19

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

PKOs bad

1 of 3

UN PKOs bad (general)

CAMPBELL

RUSSELL

SUNI - 04

GDI

problems empirically doom UN PKOs

HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK 2001 (THE BRAHIMI REPORT: POLITICIZING HUMANITARIANISM? <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2286>)

As of January 2001, some 38,000 military and civilian personnel were deployed in 15 UN peacekeeping missions across the globe, from the Western Sahara to East Timor.

Between July 2000 and June 2001, the UN will have spent around \$3bn on peacekeeping. But to what effect? The world's largest peacekeeping operation – the 13,000-strong mission in Sierra Leone – has conspicuously failed to end the violence there; operations in Rwanda did nothing to prevent genocide, and peacekeepers in the Balkans found themselves powerless to defend so-called 'safe areas' against Serb attack.

Even where operations have been deemed a success, in Cambodia for example, the threat of instability, renewed conflict and human-rights abuse is ever-present.

The acknowledged failure of peacekeeping to keep the peace gave rise to the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (the so-called Brahimi report), released in September 2000.

The document, prepared by a 10-strong panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister and one-time UN envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, bluntly analysed current weaknesses in the way the UN mounts and sustains operations. The UN overreaches, approving ambitious mandates while deploying inadequately-equipped and frequently poorly-trained forces in volatile situations. Its bureaucracy is cumbersome, with little coordination between relevant agencies. Decision-making is too slow, making timely responses to unfolding crises impossible. And – crucially – the political will does not exist to make peacekeeping forces more deployable, robust and effective.

20

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

PKOs bad
2 of 3

UN PKOs bad (general)

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

UN PKOs fail due to widespread problems

UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ("Peacekeeping - has the truth finally been revealed?" <http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/brahimi.html>)

Do the member states of the United Nations adequately support its peace operations?
The answer given by the members of the group of experts who have studied them and the lessons learned along the way is a resounding 'No'.

The Brahimi Report - Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, chaired the group - was published shortly before the UN Millennium Summit was held in early September 2000. Although the group's gender balance was deplorable - there was only one woman among its members - nevertheless it cogently argued the case that, on far too many occasions, the members of the UN Security Council (and especially the five permanent members - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States)

have failed to adopt resolutions with specific and clearly defined mandates;
have lacked either the willingness or the capacity to amend mandates as new circumstances developed on the ground in operational theatres;
have allocated too few human and other resources to the UN Secretariat as they sought to implement agreed operations;
have failed - or, worse still - have refused to take a sufficiently long-term view of the period of time that an UN operation might need to stay on the ground;
have failed to take adequate action to structure or implement uniform training for troops likely to be called on for UN peace operations;
have not made significant progress on securing member states' agreement actually to place on standby for very early deployment by the UN rapid reaction military and civilian personnel and the equipment and other resources which they would need;
have blamed the Secretariat when the going has got rough and have failed to look at their own responsibilities closely enough.

21

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

PKOs bad
3 of 3

UN PKOs bad (general)

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

UN PKOs fail for multiple reasons

THE CAMPAIGN TO END GENOCIDE 2002. (JUNE,
WWW.ENDGENOCIDE.ORG/CEG-RRF/PROBLEMS.HTM)

The responsibilities of United Nations peace operations have greatly expanded and become much more complex since the end of the Cold War, yet the resources allocated and the support necessary to satisfy those responsibilities has not expanded with the need. Indeed, in recent years the U.N. has been forced to work under horrific budget constraints imposed by misguided legislation foisted on the U.N. by its largest supporter, the United States. The budget constraints, combined with other systemic shortcomings, have greatly reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of peace operations to staggeringly low levels. The U.N. has recognized the difficulties it faces. The August 2000 Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations (the Brahmi Report) has identified many areas that need either improvement or complete overhaul.

The first problem is one of understanding. One of the goals of a peacekeeping operation is to project credible force so that those who would spoil the peace by creating new conflict are constrained. But too often the mandate, the goals, the equipment and the skill level of the troops for the mission are not adequate for the task; they cannot deal with a worst-case scenario situation. Peacekeeping operations of the 1990s have often been located in conflict areas where there was a stalemate and where the parties were not necessarily committed to ending the confrontation. If hostile parties are not serious about resolving their conflict without violence and peacekeepers are sent in anyway, but not equipped or mandated properly, the results often been failure.

Such situations may arise when a possible genocide is taking place, such as in Rwanda in early 1994 when U.N. forces were instructed to withdraw rather than protect those being massacred during the genocide, or when there is a stalemate between warring parties, such as when the U.N. peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were kidnapped and held captive by RUF (Revolutionary United Front) forces because they were not allowed to adequately defend themselves. It also happened in the former Yugoslavia where U.N. forces at Srebrenica were helpless to prevent what is believed to be the single largest slaughter of humans since World War II. From these cases and others, the Brahmi Report identified a crucial lesson the U.N. cannot always be totally impartial when operating under conditions where conflict still exists. It must be prepared and ready to respond to violence with sufficient force to protect innocent civilian lives.

22

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

U.N. PKOs Fail

Lack of Political Will

1/3

U.N. PKOs Fail - Lack of Political Will

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

NO SOLVENCY - POLITICAL WILL IS KEY TO U.N. PKOs
THE CAMPAIGN TO END GENOCIDE 2002. (JUNE,
WWW.ENDGENOCIDE.ORG/CEG-RRF/PROBLEMS.HTM)

One of the biggest problems however, and the most difficult to overcome, is generating enough political will from member states of the U.N. to support peace operations. Political will refers to the need for member states to become seriously committed to the objective of ensuring global security and peace in areas of interest. Without the support of member states, and their recognition that peace operations are a vital responsibility for the U.N., those peace operations will ultimately fail.

Unfortunately, domestic national interest too often interferes with a coherent approach to U.N. peace operations, and in so doing ignores the relevance peace operations pose to national security, as well as to the greater humanitarian good. There are fundamental political fissures that allow peace operations to be used as a political tool. The conflict of member states interests (especially within the U.N. Security Council) has had an enormous impact on the U.N. in terms of peacekeeping operations. Domestic interests have resulted in the failure of U.N. peace operations to be fully or correctly mandated, prepared, or able to engage properly in an effective and successful mission.

Peacekeeping operations can be hindered in terms of their responsiveness and initiative by strict and narrow mandates dictated by the U.N. Security Council. The U.N. and its activities are only a reflection of its member states. Thus, U.N. peace operations can only progress as far as the member states want and allow them to. The Security Council in the past has drafted and passed broad mandates for peace operations without first accruing sufficient troop and equipment commitments from member states to properly implement the resolution. This often leaves the Secretary General to scramble and to request additional troops and equipment from other

states and equipment. Also, Chapter VII troops are not authorized to carry out a Chapter VI mandate, and to take a Chapter VI mandate while creating large logistical problems within the state of the mission. Currently there are no requirements that the Security Council should create clear and achievable mandates, which would prevent these types of problems. But again, the Brahmi Report has identified the issue of the mandates as well. In the report, it states (pg. 10) that the U.N. should create

23

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

U.N. PKOs

Fail - Lack

of Political

Will

U.N. PKOs Fail - Lack of Political Will

CAMPBELL

RUSSELL

SUNI - 04

GDI

2/3

WESTERN STATES WONT SUPPORT U.N. PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS
BRATT, DUANE & GIONET, ERIN (LECTURERS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AT MOUNT ROYAL COLLEGE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALGARY, *EVALUATING THE BRAHMI REPORT*.)

OCTOBER 2000

A second issue is the dichotomy of national interests versus international concerns. Peacekeeping is inherently dangerous, even in traditional operations where a ceasefire agreement is in place and troops are deployed with the consent of opposing parties. This risk has increased with the advent of "second generation" mandates. Failed missions and the death of peacekeepers have led to accusations of UN incompetence. This has resulted in a reluctance of many troop-contributors, particularly Western states, to commit their troops to peacekeeping. Missions have therefore increasingly relied on

poorly trained and equipped troops from the developing world. This might explain American proposals for the development of regional peacekeeping forces, trained and even funded by Western states. Nevertheless, the real purpose of this strategy is not necessarily to improve the efficiency of peacekeeping, but rather to limit the potential for US casualties in areas that are not immediately related to its national interest. For example, critics within the U.S. insist that "the United States cannot intervene everywhere human rights or lives are threatened lest it leave itself unable to cope with contingencies involving vital national interests."¹⁴ This view is gradually spreading to other Western countries, who are similarly loath to subject their troops to danger and would rather have them dictating policy back at UNHQ.

UN FAILS TO SOLVE MOST DANGEROUS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS
B/C OF VITAL INTERESTS CONFLICT.

DOYLE, MICHAEL (DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, *PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW*
***CENTURY*, PG.1-11)**

1998

"Peace-enforcing fatigue" afflicted the UN's contributing countries, whether new or old. States are rarely willing to invest their resources or the lives of their soldiers in war other than for a vital interest, such as oil in the Persian Gulf. But if states have a vital national interest in a dispute, they are not likely to exercise the impartiality a UN peace operation requires. Nor are they likely to cede decision-making control over, or command of, their forces to the UN. As a result, the UN found it increasingly difficult to find troops for the dangerous operations, such as Rwanda, and to supervise the delegated operations, such as the Russian operation in Georgia. 19

24

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

U.N. PKOs Fail-
Lack of Political
Will

313

U.N. PKOs Fail-lack of Political Will

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

LACK OF POLITICAL WILL PREVENTS PKO SUCCESS.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY 2001 (REFASHIONING THE DIALOGUE:
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE BRAHIMI REPORT ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS;
REGIONAL MEETINGS FEBRUARY - JOHANNESBURG, BUENOS AIRES, SINGAPORE,
AND LONDON;

http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublRepoReseBrahimi_body.htm#executive

A UN dominated by the Security Council, a Security Council dominated by the permanent members, and the permanent members dominated by the United States practiced a double standard that marginalized Africa with respect to peace operations. This lack of political commitment or will called into question the relevance of organizational or technical reforms of the UN. Participants leavened this criticism of the UN's political leadership with ample criticism of the continent's own political leadership and its failure to articulate a meaningful agenda for change.

MEMBER STATES ARE NOT COMMITTED TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

BRATT, DUANE & GIONET, ERIN (LECTURERS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AT MOUNT ROYAL COLLEGE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALGARY, *EVALUATING THE BRAHMI REPORT*.)

OCTOBER 2000

Thus, a divide has emerged in UN peace operations: "Those with the military muscle to mount effective operations lack the courage of their convictions, and those with the will lack the military muscle."¹⁵ This represents a dangerous trend. As Brahimi noted, "you can't have a situation where some people contribute blood and some contribute money."¹⁶ Unfortunately, that is the current reality. Developing states account for more than 75% of peacekeeping troops, while the U.S., Japan and Europe pay 85% of the bill. Attempts to change the status quo are unlikely to succeed. For example, Bangladesh, the UN's top contributor of peacekeeping troops, attempted to address this problem by proposing that the Security Council's permanent five members (the US, Russia, Britain, France and China) be required to provide at least five percent of troops for any mission they approve. However, none of the P-5 supported the proposal, and it was dropped.¹⁷

25

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG
UN PKOs FAIL

112

UN PKOs FAIL: DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

~~OF SOLIDITY~~

UN PKOs WILL NEVER IMPROVE AND THE BRAHIMI REPORT IS USELESS
BECAUSE THE UN CHARTER IS INHERENTLY FLAWED.

BLAND 2000 (DOUGLAS, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
STUDIES PROGRAM AT THE SCHOOL OF POLICY STUDIES AT QUEEN'S
UNIVERSITY IN KINGSTON, ONTARIO;

<http://www.cbc.ca/newsinreview/nov2000/un/3views.htm>)

Douglas Bland is the chairman of the Defence Management Studies Program at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. He thinks that David Bercuson accepts a fundamental logical error in endorsing the main proposals of the Brahimi Report on UN peacekeeping. This is because for all its impressive recommendations, the report fails to address the fact that the main problem with UN peacekeeping operations is not in their procedures, but in the UN Charter itself. In Bland's view, this founding document of the organization prevents the UN from intervening decisively and effectively in serious international or regional conflicts. This is because the five major powers who occupy permanent seats on the Security Council control every major decision the UN makes, and have the power to veto those they oppose. They invariably act in their own national interests, especially when security issues are at stake. The Brahimi Report suggested that the UN Charter could be changed to force the members of the Security Council to regard international conflicts as global, not national interests, so that the UN could really become the main agent for peacekeeping in the world. Unfortunately, Bland believes, this is highly unlikely because the major powers would never agree to such a change in the UN Charter since it would restrict their ability to act globally in defence of their national security interests. In his view, the problem the authors of the Brahimi Report faced can be compared to the old saying that "If pigs had wings, then they could fly." In Bland's view, the report's recommendations amount to a worthy but ultimately futile attempt to sew wings on the body of the UN pig. It is an example of what he refers to as the "administrator's delusion," the idea that any major organizational problem can be fixed by changing its rules and/or procedures, not by altering the fundamental structures of the organization itself. Given the fact that the UN Charter itself prevents the organization from acting in any significant way as a global peacemaker, Bland asks himself what the international community should do instead. He concludes that in the absence of any effective UN peacekeeping presence, it is likely that peace will be made in the old-fashioned way, by great powers like the United States and the military alliances they lead, like NATO. They will act in regions where their vital economic or security interests are at stake, like the Middle East or Kosovo, but not in parts of the world that have no real economic or strategic importance to them, like most of Africa. In his view, the world is entering a new era of what he calls "neo-realpolitik." This means that the only significant peacekeeping efforts involving the use of major military force will be those that the powerful nations of the world undertake on behalf of their own interests. This may be unfortunate, but in Bland's view it is the dominant reality with which the international community must come to terms, whether it likes it or not.

26

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

UN PKOs FAIL
2/2

UN PKOs FAIL: DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

THE U.N. NEEDS DOCTRINAL CHANGES TO SOLVE
RUGGIE 1998. (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY, 249)

A doctrinal basis for robust UN peace operations must be formulated if the UN is to have a future in the terrain between traditional peacekeeping and warfighting. The British "wider peacekeeping" team focused on consent as the decisive factor. But the problem is precisely cases wherein consent is sporadic, or in which domestic authority is contested or has collapsed—and in which no party has been collectively branded an aggressor. A recent US Army field manual marks an advance, but it, too, remains unsatisfactory in the end (US Department of the Army 1994). It distinguishes between "peace operations" and "warfighting." Rejecting the doctrinal strictures of "wider peacekeeping," it further differentiates between two types of peace operations: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The major differences between those two is said to involve not only the consent of the parties, but also the role of force and the degree of impartiality in its application. Thus, in peace enforcement "consent is not absolute and force may be used to coerce or compel"—but not to defeat any belligerent (ibid.: 12). In a word, this American doctrinal effort assigns greater weight to the strategic objectives of force than its British counterpart. The manual acknowledges that peace enforcement "strains the perception of impartiality," thus requiring diligence to retain even-handedness (ibid.: 13). Moreover, "since misunderstanding can be disastrous," field commanders are encouraged to appeal to higher authorities for clarification and advice concerning these demarcations (ibid.). But it fails to indicate what those higher authorities should say when they are called upon.

THE U.N.'S LACK OF CLARITY LEADS TO DISASTER AND LACK OF
SOLVENCY
RUGGIE 1998. (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY, 243)

Neither the UN nor its member states strictly speaking have fully known what they have been doing in "gray area" peace operations, or how to do it. Frustration and failure, therefore, have been inevitable. The problem is this: The UN distinguishes between two types of collective peace operations employing military forces: enforcement and peacekeeping. But its role in a rapidly growing number of conflicts has conformed to neither. As a result, these operations have wandered about in a conceptual void (Ruggie 1993b)—in Somalia and Bosnia with tragic consequences for their participants and for the UN itself. This problem would exist regardless of whether the UN were to have its own rapid deployment force, draws on dedicated stand-by forces, or is obliged to continue the practice of waiting for countries to volunteer troops. The critical issue is not where forces come from, but the objectives and rules of engagement governing their employment and deployment.

27

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

UN PKOs

fail - slow / UN PKOs fail - too slow

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

U.N. APPROVAL PROCEDURES ARE TOO SLOW
FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

[Consent is crucial. But the nature of the operation may change when political circumstances head in unexpected directions. This is where the UN machinery and the Charter are inadequate. Chapter 7 mandates were written with prevention of conflict between states and not within them in mind. INTERFET was formed because a conventional UN mission would have taken months to mount. Yet, the need was pressing, immediate and grave. The UN would need to streamline its internal approval procedures before recruiting an international constabulary that had any hope of rapidly restoring law and order.]

28

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

PKOs fail

UN HQ Need reconstituting

4/1

U.N. PKO's fail

UN HQ need restructuring

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

U.N. PEACEKEEPING NEEDS RESTRUCTURING
THE CAMPAIGN TO END GENOCIDE 2002. (JUNE,
WWW.ENDGENOCIDE.ORG/CEG-RRF/PROBLEMS.HTM)

U.N. headquarters lacks necessary flexibility, autonomy, and resources and is often forced to operate without clear mandates, as noted earlier. At the same time, few officials at U.N. headquarters can be held accountable for the performance of the department. The organizational structure of the DPKO must also be altered. It must have better resources for planning and implementation. The U.N. lacks the staff necessary to run the basic operations of the DPKO office. Organizational restructuring should also include the latest technology for communication and transportation and the means to gather and analyze information.

29

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

UN PKO's fail-
to fundings
1/1

UN PKO's fail - Funding

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

LACK OF FUNDS PREVENTS SOLVENCY
THE CAMPAIGN TO END GENOCIDE 2002. (JUNE,
WWW.ENDGENOCIDE.ORG/CEG-RRF/PROBLEMS.HTM)

Financing is another major problem for peace operations. All member states are obligated to pay their share of peacekeeping costs under a formula that they themselves have agreed upon. Unfortunately, as of the end of 2000, \$2.1 billion (need more current figures) is due in current and back peacekeeping dues by member states. These arrears are debilitating for current and future peace operations. Quite often the U.N. is unable to pay troop-contributing nations the agreed-upon rate for their contribution to a mission. This makes it all the more difficult to secure troops for the next mission. Purchases of equipment for rapid deployment of troops for missions are incomplete because of budget troubles. The U.N. frequently juggles money from one account to another to pay for basic needs such as electricity bills, again because of shortfalls caused by member states failing to pay their dues. The U.S. is by far the largest contributor.

30

1/1
CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

U.N. PKOs Fail-Equip

U.N. PKOs Fail-No standardized Equipment

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

NO SOLVENCY - NO STANDARDIZED EQUIPMENT
THE CAMPAIGN TO END GENOCIDE 2002. (JUNE,
WWW.ENDGENOCIDE.ORG/CEG-RRF/PROBLEMS.HTM)

The Brahimi Report noted that not only are troops, civilian police and civilian administrators not on ready reserve for peace operations, but neither is the equipment necessary to support such operations. Equipment procurement and storage is another component of peace operations that is severely lacking. When it comes to peace operations, the U.N. would have the capacity to respond more quickly if standardized equipment was stored and ready to be used on short notice.

CURRENT U.N. PKOs DO NOT WORK DUE TO LACK OF TRAINING, POOR EQUIPMENT, AND ARE UNCAPABLE OF KEEPING THE PEACE GANTZ 2003. (COORD OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE PEACE OPERATIONS, NOV. 18, WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG)

Refugees International has been writing and speaking out for many years about the weaknesses of the current UN peace operations system. These weaknesses are the result of a system of voluntary contributions of troops to missions. The UN is forced to take what it can get, and too often what it gets cannot get the job done. Most peace operations in Africa, for instance, rely on troops from developing nations. These troops are frequently ill-trained, poorly equipped, and often prove to be incapable of stopping routine violence, much less dealing with the well-armed thugs that are the so-called "spoilers" of the peace. Liberia is the latest example of a leading developed nation (in this case the United States) refusing to get involved in a peace operation. While UN operations in Sierra Leone and the Congo were rescued by the British and the French, respectively, ad hoc interventions of this type do not constitute a reliable international system for conducting peace operations.

31

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

UN PKOs
fail-chain 1/

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

UN PKOs fail - poor chain of command

PROBLEMS IN THE U.N. CHAIN OF COMMAND PREVENT SOLVENCY
RUGGIE 1998. (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY, 253)

- Problems exist throughout the entire chain of command: the Security Council routinely adopts mandates that do not provide militarily meaningful guidelines to missions; troop contributing countries have no systematic input into the designing of mandates unless they happen to be Security Council members; there is no duly constituted military authority at UN headquarters to command overall operations and serve as the interface between political authorities and force commanders; and the Secretary General acts as both the Council's executive agent in military operations and neutral mediator. In theater, force commanders are required to perform operational tasks without adequate strategic guidance or plans. Their options in employing the troops and equipment provided by governments are subject to constraints by national authorities, which they do not always make known in advance. And national contingent commanders often seek instructions from their capitals before acting on orders by UN force commanders—a practice that is hardly surprising but delays and can jeopardize the success of field actions while further undermining unity-in-command. Linking UN peace operations with non-UN "peace enforcement" components has also proved difficult: attempts to couple UN and NATO commands through a "dual key" arrangement for NATO airstrikes in Bosnia led to confusion and mutual recrimination, degrading the mission of both; decoupling UN and US command structures in Somalia produced calamity. As a result, UN military units have been unable to act strategically, quickly, and on a sustained basis.

32

1/1
CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

U.N. Institutional
changes Fail

U.N. Institutional Changes Fail

**CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI**

INSTITUTIONS CHANGES DON'T SOLVE U.N. PROBLEMS.

**BRATT, DUANE & GIONET, ERIN (LECTURERS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AT MOUNT ROYAL COLLEGE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALGARY, *EVALUATING THE BRAHMI REPORT*.)**

OCTOBER 2000

The first point is that the United Nations is not a supranational authority, instead it is dependent upon its membership. Therefore, the problems plaguing UN peace operations cannot be solved through institutional changes alone. The United Nations' difficulties extend beyond administrative and organizational concerns. Canadian writer Jocelyn Coulon illustrates the point lucidly in his analysis of modern peacekeeping: Even if we acknowledge that there is some justice in the criticism of excessive bureaucratization, waste, the proliferation of commissions and committees, the incompetence of some staff and the lack of human and technical resources required to manage peacekeeping operations, we have to ask who bears the responsibility for these problems.... If there is blame to be laid, it should be laid at the feet of the member states and the great

powers, because they are the ones who refuse to grant the UN the human and financial resources it needs to fulfill the mandates that they so generously bestow in votes in the General Assembly and Security Council.¹³

33

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

08 PM
must come 1st

1/1

No Solvency Peacemaking must come first

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

LACK OF PEACEMAKING PREVENTS PEACEKEEPING

UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ("Peacekeeping - has the truth finally been revealed?" <http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/brahimi.html>)

In relation to peacemaking - i.e. actions (often, but not always, military) taken by the UN in crises where violence is continuing with no peace yet to keep - the report talks of the reluctance of a large number of UN member states (including many in the North, including NATO members) to deploy troops or other personnel in to high risk operations, fearing a very adverse public and media opinion if body bags started to arrive home for burial. It thus challenges the Security Council to state quite explicitly why it has decided not to become involved in any particular crisis situation (even when the broad thrust of media and public opinion may be calling for it to do so).

34

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

NoS - Comm.

1/1

No Solvency - Poor Communication

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN G-8
COUNTRIES PREVENTS PKO SOLVENCY
EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING.ORG 2004. (JUNE,
WWW.EFFECTIVEPEACEKEEPING.ORG)

Analysis: Numerous attempts have been undertaken since the early nineties to enhance African peacekeeping capacity. Nevertheless, the number of African troops available for peacekeeping has barely increased over the past decade. Furthermore, the U.S., the EU, and certain EU member states have devoted significant funds to programs for building peacekeeping capacity in Africa that may well have overlapped each other. Greater coordination between G-8 members should ensure that funds and efforts to build African and global peacekeeping capacity are used efficiently, and lead to measurable improvements.

35

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No (S) - No Transportation

No (S) - No Transportation

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

LACK OF TRANSPORTATION PREVENTS PKO
SOLVENCY

EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING.ORG 2004. (JUNE,
WWW.EFFECTIVEPEACEKEEPING.ORG)

Analysis: Too often UN peacekeeping operations are hampered by the inability to get troops to the places they are needed. Furthermore, when peacekeeping troops

are deployed, it is often without functioning transportation and communications equipment, ammunition for their weapons, and appropriate clothing for the climate. While recent improvements to the UN's logistical supply base at Brindisi, Italy have been helpful, the base has nevertheless been rapidly exhausted by the demands of current operations. To be more effective, UN peacekeeping troops must have access to armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, and air transport. These are things only developed countries, and primarily only the U.S., can provide.

36

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No ⑤ - logistical
1 of 5

No ⑤ - Logistical problems

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

U.N. LOGISTICAL SHORTCOMING PREVENT
SOLVENCY

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 96)

Logistics are the Achilles' heel of international police missions. Military forces arrive with their own equipment and transport; CIVPOL must be provided with everything but their uniforms. Former UN CIVPOL commissioners who attended a 1995 "lessons learned" conference in Singapore listed lack of logistical support as their biggest problem. They reported they had no financial authority for even routine or local purchases and that their recommendations concerning the material needs of the mission often were ignored. Field missions were reliant upon UN headquarters for administrative support, which was often delayed or simply not forthcoming. The commissioners also complained about a lack of dialogue between headquarters and the field and headquarters' lack of awareness of changes in requirements over the life of the mission.³⁴

Unfortunately, the United Nations has done little to address the problem, and UN "blue tape" continues to snarl operations. The UN has a logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, but its shelves are often bare and equipment and vehicles often are not in serviceable condition. There is also a problem with procurement and replenishing supplies: The UN budget process is complex and does not readily provide for spending on contingencies. Normally the Security Council must authorize a peace-keeping mission before DPKO can begin procurement. The UN has made an effort to stockpile mission start-up kits, but these are quickly depleted and difficult to replace. There is a need for improvements in warehouse management and inventory control. There is also a need for preplanning and for rosters of administrative personnel who understand the UN system and can deploy with the mission to ensure a smooth start-up.³⁵

16 April 1996, Camp Campbell, Brindisi, Italy, W. 1.

37

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No ⑤ - Logistical

2 of 5

No ⑤ - Logistical problems

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

JOINT TRAINING AND DOCTRINES ARE KEY TO
SUCCESSFUL CONSTABULARY FORCES

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 327)

< Many of the problems encountered by constabulary forces in the Balkans remained unresolved. However, making certain such problems would not trouble future stability operations would not be difficult. Constabulary units demonstrated that they were highly capable, versatile, and effective, if properly utilized. Missing were clear mandates, common doctrine, and joint training programs. There was also a failure to properly brief senior commanders on how these units could be used most effectively. Providing clear mandates and rules of engagement for constabulary forces would ensure that everyone understood their role and mission. Drafting common doctrine and developing joint training programs would require both unit commanders and their superiors to work together and to develop the understanding and trust that was missing in Bosnia and Kosovo. >

38

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No ⑤ - logistical
3 of 5

No ⑤ - Logistical problems

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

CONSTABULARY FORCES DEPLOY SLOWY

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 205)

From the point of view of the UN CIVPOL Division, however, the deployment of the SPU to Kosovo was one time when the UN system worked more quickly than might reasonably have been expected. That the first SPU arrived in Kosovo in April 2000, ten months after the start of the UN mission, was viewed as an achievement by the CIVPOL Division. This was the first instance in which the United Nations had deployed "formed" constabulary units in a police mission, and time was required for conceptualizing and planning the creation of the force. Since the UN did not simply take existing units, potential donors had to wait until planning for the force structure and the concept of operations was completed before determining whether they could participate in the mission. Those countries that decided to go forward then engaged in negotiations with the UN and ultimately signed agreements covering the terms for participation, including a specific list of duties their forces would perform. At the same time, the CIVPOL Division had to obtain funding through the complicated UN budget process to lease or purchase the equipment needed to outfit ten units. Donor countries also had to recruit, organize, and train the new forces.³⁴

Another reason for the delay in deploying the SPU was the need to locate and refurbish suitable facilities to house the units before their arrival. While these formed units came equipped with their own vehicles and communications, they were not outfitted like military units and were unprepared to live in the field. They could not set up camp and operate independently of the local infrastructure. Instead, they required the elements associated with a police headquarters—offices, barracks, and garages—plus electricity, heat, and water. Each unit required a kitchen and dining facility capable of feeding 120 people twice a day with food service available for duty personnel around the clock. All units brought along medical personnel, requiring an infirmary.³⁵

39

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No ③ - logistical
4 of 45

No ③ - Logistical problems

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

DIFFERENT NATIONAL TACTICS LIMIT SOLVENCY OF
CONSTABULARY FORCES

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 219-220)

Second, the United Nations had expected that most of the SPU's would come from countries in western Europe. In fact, European countries, which were also members of NATO, preferred to have their gendarmes serve as members of KFOR and not in the UNMIK police. After efforts to recruit European units were largely unsuccessful, the UN turned to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet republics. This meant dealing with donor countries that represented a broad range of military and police traditions and

cultures.⁷⁰ It also meant accepting some forces that were more military in character and others that were an unknown quantity in terms of how they might react if they became involved in a violent confrontation. UNMIK officials were leery of employing the SPU's in situations where they might use tactics that would cause civilian casualties. Following their arrival, several of the SPU's received additional training in civil disorder management with an emphasis on nonviolent means of maintaining public order. In sectors where KFOR maintained primacy for law enforcement and public order, military commanders preferred to rely on constabulary units that were part of their own commands rather than cross jurisdictional boundaries and use forces that had a different chain of command and rules of engagement. At the same time, senior UN officials were reluctant to press KFOR to utilize the SPU's, particularly in Mitrovica, fearing KFOR might seize the opportunity to shed responsibility for what were frustrating and dangerous assignments.⁷¹ ➤

40

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No ⑤ - logistical
5 of 5

No ⑤ - Logistical problems

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

NATIONAL STANDBY FORCES DON'T WORK

URQUHART 1998 [BRIAN, FORMER UNDER-SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THE NEW
CENTURY, PP. 190-191]

The solution most often proposed for the current problems of UN operations is the organization of standby forces by governments for UN service. It has been further suggested by the secretary-general that governments should train and make available standby rapid deployment units—possibly composed of volunteers—for immediate UN service. These units would be specially trained and would train periodically with each other as well.

The response from governments to the idea of rapid deployment standby units has been, at best, noncommittal, and at present the signs are not encouraging. Governments are increasingly reluctant to provide

troops for violent civil conflicts in countries far removed from their region and national interest, especially for immediate deployment at the outset of a crisis. There would therefore be no certainty that—even if based on volunteers—standby national rapid deployment units would actually be available when they were needed. (Not one of the nineteen governments with peacekeeping standby agreements with the UN was willing to provide troops urgently for Rwanda in the summer of 1994.) Neither the tone nor the substance of the current debate on peacekeeping in Washington is encouraging in this respect either and may well have a considerable impact on the attitude of other governments toward participating in UN operations. In the foreseeable future, therefore, it seems likely that governmental response, even when a standby arrangement exists, cannot be taken for granted in all cases, and especially if immediate action is needed.

41

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

no ⑤ - 1/1
courts

no ⑤ - Must have courts/prisons

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

**NO SOLVENCY- MUST HAVE COURTS AND PRISONS FOR
CONSTABULARY FORCES TO BE EFFECTIVE.**

COLLINS, PERITO, SPEAR 2003 (JOSEPH J., Senior Fellow In Political-Military Studies, The Center For Strategic And International Studies, ROBERT, Special Advisor, Rule of Law Program United States Institute of Peace, JOANNA, Ph.D., Southampton University, UK, Director of the U.S. Foreign Policy Institute; OCTOBER 14, "BRIDGING THE POST SECURITY GAP" SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND ORGANIZATION, <http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF/CPRFOctober2003.pdf>)

Mr. Perito explained that the constabulary and police cannot function effectively without the other two parts of the "justice triad," namely courts and prisons. The U.S. must be able to quickly deploy teams of lawyers, judges, court administrators and corrections officers for service in post-conflict operations. These teams would have authority to act independently and could decide to handle sensitive cases on their own without referring them to local authorities. Their primary mission would be to insure accountability for human rights violations, provide guidance on dealing with war criminals, provide training and assist with reform of the local justice system. Corrections officers would supervise the handling of prisoners, oversee the release of those imprisoned for political offenses, insure the humane treatment of prisoners and help rehabilitate prison facilities. For Iraq, a U.S. Stability Force would probably include a civilian constabulary of two thousand five hundred personnel and civil police of between four thousand and six thousand personnel. If used wisely, such a force could have significant impact.

**NO SOLVENCY - CONSTABULARY FORCES DO NOT
WORK WITHOUT JUDICIAL AND PENAL SYSTEMS**

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 333)

- In Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the judicial systems literally lay in ruins. Courthouses and detention centers were destroyed. Law books and legal codes had been burned. Judges, prosecutors, and court administrators had either disappeared or were too intimidated to serve. Constabulary and police are important, but they cannot function effectively without the other two parts of the "justice triad," courts and prisons. Democracies require that those arrested are processed by a functioning judicial and penal system, without which restoration of public order is effectively and immediately compromised. In the long run, there is also a failure to provide a sense of justice for the victims of war crimes, human rights violations, and other criminal activities, which is essential to achieving sustainable security.

42

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

OS b/c Dom
conflict

Ø(S) Domestic constraints

1/1

**DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS PREVENT THE UN STANDING FORCES
FOOT, MACFARLANE, AND MASTANDUNO 02**

(Rosemary Foot, Politician in British Parliament; S. Neil MacFarlane, Professor of International Relations at Oxford and member of UN International Institute of Strategic Studies; Michael Mastanduno, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, from US Hegemony and International Organizations, p.17-18)

— The capacity to construct barriers to the discussion of particular policy problems and disputes is a form of power available for US use in multilateral organizations.²³ It is widely agreed that American reluctance to contemplate the existence of standing multilateral peacekeeping forces, and the provisions of the Helms-Biden Act prohibiting payment of US arrears in the event that the UN reaches agreement with any country on the earmarking of forces for use by the UN, have effectively prevented serious consideration of the creation

of such capabilities. A second example is the unwillingness of the United States to contemplate the development of alternatives to state-based financing of UN activities. In contrast, the US desire to replicate its own understandings of macroeconomic theory and its normative preferences with regard to the international economy has served to shift the agendas of international financial and development institutions towards economic neo-liberalism. Similarly, African leaders, Nei argues, have come to accept that neo-liberal economic solutions provide the only viable route to economic advancement. And, as discussed by Hal Klepak in Chapter 10, the growing salience of democratization on the agenda of the OAS is related to American preferences. The same is true of the profile given to eastward enlargement on the agenda of NATO. 17-1 2

LB

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No ⑤
Civilian/Military
Disagreement
✓

No ⑤: Civilian Military Disagreement

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE DO NOT WORK
WELL TOGETHER

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 86-87)

These differences between soldiers and police officers can create problems when they try to work together. The distinction between military and police training in the use of force and the language used to describe it was evident in an incident that occurred during the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles. During the disturbances, LAPD operated in joint patrols with federal troops and the California National Guard. A mixed team of U.S. Marines and LAPD officers went to an apartment building in response to a call concerning a domestic dispute. Outside the building, the patrol took cover and discussed how they would enter the building. The senior police officer told his military counterpart that he would go in first. He then said, "Cover me!" On receiving this order from the police officer, the Marines fired more than two hundred rounds into the building, where there were children.¹³ The Marines' reaction was the result of training and vocabulary: In police parlance, "cover me" means be prepared to fire your weapon if I am in danger. This definition follows the police principle of using only the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission. For the Marines, "cover me," means open fire at once to suppress anyone who might try to impede my advance. 86-7

44

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No 6 -
Conflict

No solvency - Can't fight Conflict

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

CONSTABULARY FORCES ARE NOT EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH CONFLICT SITUATIONS

FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

Why is there a different mindset towards the police and the ADF? Three reasons come to mind. First, the personal firearms used by the police do not compare with the destructive capacity of weapon systems operated by the military while there is a perception that the police are more easily and readily accountable than the military.

Second, criminal and other illegal behaviour is something most people have experienced even in a minor form and want stopped. Conversely, few people have any understanding of enemy occupation or the threats of tyrannical regimes and desperation of those subject to them. Third, the role of police is to uphold publicly promulgated laws based on ethical principles to which individuals are accountable while the military is deployed in pursuit of strategic, diplomatic and economic aims with respect to an undefined subject group as part of a larger political agenda.

NON GOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE SOLVED THOROUGH CONSTABULARY FORCES

FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

Second, the existence of terrorist groups or global corporations that have no territorial base or national allegiance is a complexity needing careful management. We are presently on the fault line between a world populated by nation-states, each of which ultimately pursues its own interest, and a global society, in which power is dispersed between multinational companies and organisations. Some organisations have embraced nation states and effectively subjugated them while multinational corporations undermine them from within. The complexity of dealing with international lawlessness and global aggression has the potential to prompt local diplomatic incidents and create hostility between member states and the Security Council.

45

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

NO ③, attack
on
PKOs 1/1

No Solvency - Attacks on PKOs

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

NON-CONSENTING GROUPS WILL ATTACK PKOs TO CAUSE WITHDRAWL
FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

Clearly, the UN is now more prepared to engage in missions with only partial consent than ever before. But how is consent measured? When does the UN have sufficient consent to intervene? The level of consent will often determine whether an intervention becomes an invasion (as it did in Haiti in 1995) and the extent to which a constabulary force would be respected or opposed. Experience has shown that non-consenting factions can readily repel a UN mission and lead to its withdrawal by inflicting 'unacceptable casualties' on peacekeepers. This occurred in relation to American participation in Lebanon during 1983 and Somalia a decade later.

CONSTABULARY FORCES ARE EMPIRICALLY
ABUSED & Cause Hostile reaction
EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING.ORG 2004. (JUNE,
WWW.EFFECTIVEPEACEKEEPING.ORG)

Analysis: The use of constabulary police is not a panacea. In many post-conflict societies the line between the military and the police may have become blurred, and the security forces may have been part of the conflict and the oppression of civilians. In addition, Spain, France and other European powers left behind constabulary police forces in their former colonies. The U.S. created constabulary police forces in various countries in the Caribbean. Many of these forces were subsequently perverted and misused by despotic regimes to consolidate and hold onto power. Given this legacy, intervening constabulary police forces might provoke a negative reaction from the civilian population. Efforts to explain the role of the international constabulary police will have to accompany their deployment. Common doctrines and well-maintained standards of conduct will therefore assist in ensuring that constabulary police missions accomplish their tasks successfully, in cooperation with those they are trying to help.

46

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

NO 60-UN DDR WIS

11

116 (S)-UN DDR fails

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

UN DISARMMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION STRATEGIES ARE INEFFECTIVE.

COLLINS, PERITO, SPEAR 2003 (JOSEPH J., Senior Fellow In Political-Military Studies, The Center For Strategic And International Studies, ROBERT, Special Advisor, Rule of Law Program United States Institute of Peace, JOANNA, Ph.D., Southampton University, UK, Director of the U.S. Foreign Policy Institute; OCTOBER 14, "BRIDGING THE POST SECURITY GAP" SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND ORGANIZATION, <http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF/CPRFOctober2003.pdf>)

Dr. Spear explained that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) has been an important component of past post-conflict peace operations. Of these three strategies, reintegration perhaps matters most. In areas where there is little or no arms control, and weapons are extremely cheap and readily available, disarmament has primarily symbolic meaning. It is more important to bring about a situation in which individuals do not feel the need to obtain or use weapons because they feel secure.

There are recurring dilemmas in UN efforts to engage in DDR, and unfortunately, there is also a lack of a learning curve between missions. One of these dilemmas is whether to prioritize victims or perpetrators. There is an obvious interest in securing justice for victims as well as providing them with the rule of law to enable them to function effectively. At the same time however, aggressors have the potential to undermine peace. Different answers have been offered to this dilemma. During the UN peace operation in Mozambique however, Aldo Ajello suggested that it is most important to placate those who have guns.

A second dilemma for DDR is timetabling. Effective DDR probably demands a three to four year timetable, yet political and financial imperatives make such a timetable extremely difficult to implement. If people are not properly reintegrated it is easy for them to drift back into being "entrepreneurs of violence."

A third dilemma is the question of whether to retain existing security forces to provide protection from micro insecurity. This option is extremely tempting, yet pre-existing forces may have been perpetrators of violence during the conflict. Policing is another important element of the micro insecurity dilemma and is an area in which UN practice is extremely underdeveloped. Experience with UN peace operations suggest that there is such a difference in policing styles between nations that simply bringing different nationalities of police officers together can be problematic. Moreover, the UN is often poor at understanding the societies where it undertakes operations. For example, it may fail to understand what societal rules govern guns and combatants in different countries. An innovative idea might be to deploy 'crack squads' of anthropologists into the field to aid the international community in working with different societies. ➤

47

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

No (S) Need CIVPOL

No (S) Need CIVPOL

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

WITHOUT CIVILIAN POLICE, CONSTABULARY
FORCES ARE USELESS

PERITO 2004. (DEPT DIR INTL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING,
WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY
FORCE, 331-332)

Civil Police

Military police and civilian constabulary forces have the technical skills to restore public order and engage in law enforcement, but they cannot serve as role models for indigenous civil police. They

also should not be required to engage in the patient work of traffic control, community policing, and criminal investigation, which are normally the responsibilities of civil police in democratic societies. U.S. law prohibits the U.S. military from training foreign civilian police, and both Congress and common sense require the use of U.S. civil law-enforcement professionals to serve as role models for indigenous police in an emerging democracy. Failure to deploy a civil police force with executive authority to enforce a basic criminal code will result in prolonged deployment of military and constabulary forces. 331-2

48

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG
No (S) No security council
enforcement

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

No (S) No security council enforcement

THE UNSC HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE CONSTABULARY FORCES'
DECISIONS
FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

[The operation of an international constabulary depends almost entirely upon the existence of a legitimate authority?

Writing in the SMH (22-23 December 2001), Geoffrey Robertson QC argued that the 'lawful justification for overthrowing the Taliban is the obligation of the world community to stop the commission of crimes against humanity and to punish their perpetrators'. But there were several pre-conditions: 'force must be a last resort, there must be Security Council approval and a commitment to reconstruct the country'. The last resort condition is straightforward; other means must be tried first. The 'clear commitment to reconstructing the country' is practically commendable but doubtful as a compelling moral principal. What is not clear is why a UNSC resolution is a pre-condition? I have no difficulty with the issue of a legal or diplomatic resolution outlining the breach of international law or convention, advising all parties of the action they should take before specific direction is given and enforced. The body of extant international law is sufficiently broad and detailed to regulate the conduct of modern international relations. My difficulty is with the imputation that the UNSC is the only legitimate authority in determining whether and when force can be used in seeking compliance with a resolution.

While many states would agree to the transfer of power from the litigant to the law, they are concerned about the court in which that law is interpreted, judged and enforced. A fair, impartial and credible body to which disputes can be referred is required. This body must have the prestige and authority to determine matters referred to it, and to make certain orders and issue specific directions. It must also have the power to enforce its determinations. The present membership and constitution of the UNSC is not that body. The five permanent members have been compromised in various ways by their past actions or their present legacies while they themselves are likely to become the subject of matters referred to the Security Council for judgement. The Security Council as presently constituted is too self-interested, too small and too smug to be the kind of fair and impartial body that is needed to arbitrate and resolve and international disputes.

49

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

⑤
Media Coverage
1 of 1

NO ⑤ Media Coverage

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

MEDIA COVERAGE PREVENTS SUCCESSFUL RECONSTRUCTION.

COLLINS, PERITO, SPEAR 2003 (JOSEPH J., Senior Fellow In Political-Military Studies, The Center For Strategic And International Studies, ROBERT, Special Advisor, Rule of Law Program United States Institute of Peace, JOANNA, Ph.D., Southampton University, UK, Director of the U.S. Foreign Policy Institute; OCTOBER 14, "BRIDGING THE POST SECURITY GAP" SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND ORGANIZATION, <http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF/CPRFOctober2003.pdf>)

Second, security building and reconstruction activities are interactive and simultaneous. They do not, however, attract similar amounts of media coverage. Compare the difficulties of, for example, a reporter covering a car bombing and covering the national health care system in a developing country just coming out of war. Media coverage of two recent car bombings in Iraq has failed to highlight the fact that both bombings missed their intended targets. At the same time, little attention has been paid to the fact that one hundred per cent of Iraq's healthcare units are currently up and running at somewhere between ninety and one hundred per cent of pre-war effectiveness. Similarly, there is little awareness that eighty-two thousand Iraqis are currently working with coalition forces, or that ninety per cent of Iraqi schools are now open with two hundred and fifty thousand Iraqi teachers back in their jobs and on the pay roll. As a result, the success of reconstruction efforts can become hostage to the media. While guerillas may be unable to hold terrain, they can certainly monopolize headlines. Progress in Iraq and Afghanistan has been smothered by news stories of bombings and sadly, pictures of dead soldiers.

50

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

was
military 1/1
culture

No (S) - Military Culture

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

CONSTABULARY FORCES REQUIRE CHANGES TO MILITARY CULTURE
FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

In any event, for an international constabulary to operate effectively three paradigm changes within the military would be necessary. First, military forces must wholeheartedly accept the roles of humanitarian assistance and 'aid to the civil power' in disaster and environmental crisis in addition to their traditional roles of combat and deterrence. They must internalise the expectations of these new roles and broaden the measure of what it means to be in the military. The addition of roles would entail a call to internal cultural redefinition. Second, the military's ethos and values need to accept that victory is not the primary measure of success. It may be better to end violence and restore order than to defeat an adversary and destroy their capacity to fight. Stalemates, impasses and containment might be acceptable or even superior outcomes from an intervention. The division of Cyprus and Korea, and the limited objectives of the first Gulf War and the NATO intervention in Kosovo, were instances in which a total military victory was neither sought nor achieved. Political realities may be such that an acceptable resolution is preferred to a perfect one. This is contrary to much military thinking. Third, there is no longer a requirement for military forces to provide comprehensive defence against every conceivable threat to potentially aggressive neighbours. The growth of multi-lateralism means that the military capabilities of like-minded nations can be complementary or shared. Military forces no longer need to be completely autonomous in terms of command and control while they must be more pervious to political direction. This means they must exercise more closely and more frequently in multinational settings, developing standard operating procedures and confidence in each other's abilities.



CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

⑤
Define ROL

1 of 1

NO ⑤ Define Rule of Law

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

NO SOLVENCY; NO WAY TO DEFINE RULE OF LAW

LEWIS, MARKS, AND PERITO 02 (William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito- National Security Council: Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. "*Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations*." <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html> April 22, 2002)

While much remains to be done, one speaker noted that much of the "low fruit has been picked" and there have been considerable improvements in the conduct of international police missions over the past decade. The international community has been less successful, however, in providing assistance to judicial systems during peace operations. Some workshop participants noted that little progress has been registered over the past two years in establishing a baseline "rule of law" program under the terms of PDD-71. In reality, there is little agreement within the U.S. government as to a reasonable definition of the term "rule of law." At one point in mid-2000, more than a dozen definitions were circulating within Washington. In most instances, they reflected agency interests as opposed to a comprehensive conceptual definition. According to several workshop participants, the United States should continue to push for a comprehensive justice system package for peace operations. As one participant observed, however, a single "cookie cutter" approach would be counter-productive given the diverse environments in which peacekeeping forces might be introduced.

52

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

ICC prev. ⑤
1 of 1

ICC prevents ⑤

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

**THE ICC JURISDICTON THREATENS FUTURE U.S. ROLE IN U.N. PK'S
DREIER & HAMILTON, 2002.** (DAVID & LEE, NOVEMBER 14, MASTER'S DEGREE IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, P. 21)

◀ The upswing in the U.S.-UN relationship since September 11, 2001, is already being tested. First, there is a need to maintain the intensity of the international antiterror campaign and avoid "counterterrorism fatigue." Second, the United States should forthrightly address, rather than avoid, the policy tensions that arise when the imperatives of the war against terrorism compete with human rights and democratic principles. Third, many member states, particularly EU members, expected that the international solidarity expressed after September 11 would significantly alter U.S. positions on multilateral issues of special importance to them. This turned out to be a false expectation, and the Bush administration's continued opposition to multilateral agreements it believes can infringe on U.S. sovereignty has become a sharp disappointment to some UN member states and a point of great friction. Matters came to a head in June and July 2002, when Washington's efforts to inoculate U.S. and other forces serving in UN peacekeeping missions from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) led to a U.S. veto of the UN mandate in Bosnia. While the Security Council forged a compromise formula exempting all peacekeeping forces from the scrutiny of the ICC for one year, the issue promises to be an ongoing point of contention in the coming years.

**CONSTABULARY FORCES DO NOT HAVE CORRECT MANDATES AND NO
SOLVENCY WITHOUT SIGNING THE ICC**

FRAME 2003. (BISHOP TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, SEPT 5)

◀ The missions in Rwanda and Somalia demonstrate that it is one thing to have an international constabulary, it is another to deploy them in the right numbers with the right expertise, to give them reasonable and workable ROEs, to maintain the political will to implement UN resolutions, and to ensure they do not belong to nations complicit in the conflict. A constabulary force dominated by French troops would be unsuitable for operations in the Ivory Coast or New Caledonia; Americans would not be welcome in Iraq or Iran, Australian participation in Aceh or West Papua would be resisted. As each nation trains its own soldiers to serve in its own military under its own law, all nations participating in the constabulary would also need to be signatories to the ICC Convention. This might preclude the involvement of troops from some nations.

⑤

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Brahimi report

Bad

1/5

Brahimi Report Bad

CAMPBELL

RUSSELL

SUNI - 04

GDI

THE BRAHIMI REPORT DOESN'T SOLVE UN PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS.

HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK 2001 (THE BRAHIMI REPORT: POLITICIZING HUMANITARIANISM? <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2286>)

The Brahimi report was welcomed at the UN's Millennium Summit late last year as a timely analysis of the problems, and a useful prescription for change. Yet operations in both Sierra Leone and the Congo, for example, breach many of the principles it advanced. The long-term aim of the UN operation in Sierra Leone is unclear, and the capacity of the UN to make a sensible contribution to what is a hugely unstable situation in the Congo is questionable at best. Member states are incapable of producing the sometimes very large contingents that a proper operation requires, while the quality of cease-fires, truces, military disengagements and peace arrangements is often too poor to support peacekeeping.

LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO CHANGE MAKES THE BRAHIMI REPORT USELESS.

BRATT, DUANE & GIONET, ERIN (LECTURERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT MOUNT ROYAL COLLEGE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, *EVALUATING THE BRAHIMI REPORT*.)

OCTOBER 2000

Many of the recommendations contained in the Brahimi Report simply state the obvious or echo previous unimplemented suggestions for peacekeeping reform. This criticism has been leveled against the UN before. For example, in a critique of the UN's lessons-learned unit, Jarat Chopra asserted that it "produced few creative ideas" and that "by far the majority of 'lessons' were banal conclusions that have been known for decades."

The Brahimi Report's recommendation for "clear, credible and achievable mandates" is a prime example of this phenomenon. The Panel noted that ambiguous peacekeeping mandates are often a result of the Security Council's efforts to achieve a consensus. The Report urged that if mandate clarity cannot be achieved, then the Council should "refrain from mandating such a mission" (p. 7). This recommendation is

5
straightforward and reflects a strong degree of commonsense. Who is going to argue against clarity in favour of ambiguity? Unfortunately, this particular recommendation has been made in every peacekeeping reform package of the 1990s. Prominent examples abound. The Clinton Administration's 1994 policy on peace operations, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), developed criteria for evaluating potential peace operations that emphasized mandates with "clearly defined objectives." In addition, almost every UN document on peacekeeping reform from the last six years is littered with phrases like: "whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated;" "the mandate for a peacekeeping operation should be as clear as possible to allow it to be translated into a detailed operational plan, leaving no room for ambiguity or differing perceptions as to the roles and tasks of various elements;" and "the mandate for a peacekeeping operation should be clear, realistic and practicable."

54

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Brahimi report

bad
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Brahimi report bad

CAMPBELL
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The Brahimi Report's recommendations for improving the UN's rapid reaction capability suffer from a similar malady. Ever since the UN was unable to engineer an adequate and timely response to the crisis in Rwanda, demands to improve the UN's rapid reaction capability have persisted. Again, who is going to take the side of delay over promptness? For instance, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* made this recommendation.¹⁰ The countries of Canada and Denmark also conducted comprehensive studies on the topic.¹¹ Finally, there exists a vast academic literature recommending improvements to the UN's rapid reaction capability.¹²

What explains this need to repeat *ad nauseam* the same recommendations?

Simply put, the UN and its member states are indeed aware of the problems with

6
peacekeeping, as well as the potential solutions, but are unwilling to supply the political will to change the situation. The reluctance of member states to support the necessary peacekeeping reforms stems from three factors: the protection of state sovereignty; an unwillingness to sacrifice national interests for international concerns; and a lack of financial commitment. →

55

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Brahimi Report

Bad

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Brahimi Report Bad

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BRAHIMI REPORT DOESN'T ADDRESS CENTRAL PROBLEMS OF U.N. PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS.

BRATT, DUANE & GIONET, ERIN (LECTURERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT MOUNT ROYAL COLLEGE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, *EVALUATING THE BRAHMI REPORT*.)

OCTOBER 2000

It is also interesting to note that the Brahimi Report was strangely silent on the question of how to provide a sound financial structure for peacekeeping. The report contains a series of minor suggestions: granting the Secretary-General the authority to draw up to US\$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund; reviewing its procurement policies and procedures; and moving the budget for the DPKO HQ from the peacekeeping budget to the regular budget (p.56-57). However, these types of incremental changes, as Diehl and PharoahKhan noted, "essentially rely on fine-tuning status quo mechanisms." They still "fail to provide the necessary funds needed for current and expanded UN peacekeeping operations," and are unable "to overcome the political and economic barriers that cripple the UN's ability to raise funds."²¹

In evaluating the Brahimi Report it is important to examine not just what is contained, but also what is absent. There are a number of recommendations that could have been implemented by the UN without challenging the resources of member states. A particularly obvious example is the use of gratis military personnel in DPKO. Both Kofi Annan and Richard Holbrooke are in favour of restoring the right of the UN to borrow military officers whose salaries are paid by member governments.²² The reason why the use of gratis military personnel is not even mentioned, let alone recommended in the Brahimi Report is because of its contentious nature. The General Assembly

10

introduced a ban on the use of gratis personnel in 1997 because much of the developing world feared that these individuals would remain loyal to their national governments, thereby increasing the level of influence that richer countries would have over peacekeeping policy.²³ The inability of the Brahimi Report to tackle more controversial recommendations is indicative of the UN's unwillingness – not just this Panel but most UN committees, particularly the blue-ribbon, eminent persons types – to make tough choices. >

56

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Brahimi Report
Bad
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Brahimi Report Bad

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THE BRAHIMI REPORT DOESN'T IMPORVE UN PKOs.

MACKENZIE 2000 (LEWIS; MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES; FIRST COMMANDER OF UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES DISPATCHED TO SARAJEVO, BOSNIA; <http://www.cbc.ca/newsinreview/nov2000/un/3views.htm>) Lewis Mackenzie served in the Canadian Armed Forces for 40 years. He was the first commander of the UN peacekeeping forces dispatched to Sarajevo, Bosnia, after violent clashes erupted in that area between local Serb, Muslim, and Croat forces. He regarded the recent UN Millennium Summit with a mixture of hope and skepticism. While he was pleased that the world leaders gathered in New York endorsed the main points of the Brahimi Report, he feared that their retorical support for it would not lead to serious implementation of its major recommendations. And while he views the report itself as a document containing many worthwhile proposals, he has serious misgivings about some of them. For instance, the report urges the UN to identify the aggressor and the victim in a local conflict early on, and immediately side with the latter against the former. From Mackenzie's experience in Bosnia, he feels that this is too simplistic because it is frequently difficult for outside observers unfamiliar with the background to the conflict to make that kind of quick judgment. While serving in Sarajevo, Mackenzie often found to his frustration that his own conclusions about who was to blame for a particular outbreak of fighting would be thwarted by the political alignments of the various permanent members of the Security Council. For instance, if Mackenzie blamed the Bosnian Serbs, their Russian allies would protest, while if he found the Muslims or Croats at fault, the United States would be very unhappy. After the publication of the Brahimi Report, some Canadian observers suggested that Canada limit its involvement in future peacekeeping missions to training and expertise. Mackenzie takes issue with this idea, arguing that developed countries like Canada must shoulder some of the burden of troop support for UN operations, and not expect poorer developing countries to take on the task themselves. For this to happen, though, he believes that it is essential for the federal government to restore a healthy level of funding to the Canadian Forces, whose operational capacities to participate effectively in UN peacekeeping missions have been severely reduced by a decade of huge cuts to the national defence budget.

57

CONSTABULARY FORCES NEG

Brahimi
Report Bad
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Brahimi Report Bad

CAMPBELL
RUSSELL
SUNI - 04
GDI

BRAHIMI CONFLATES PKOs AND HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS, THREATENING THE VIABILITY OF BOTH.

HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK 2001 (THE BRAHIMI REPORT: POLITICIZING HUMANITARIANISM? <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2286>)

What does Brahimi mean for humanitarians? Better, perhaps, to ask what humanitarians meant for Brahimi. Although the Brahimi panel included a former head of USAID and a former president of the ICRC, there is little mention of specifically humanitarian issues beyond references to legal instruments.

Yet peacekeeping does not take place in a vacuum: where there are peacekeepers, there will also be aid agencies; what peacekeepers do and how they do it can impinge on the activities of these agencies, many of whom might have been working in a country long before the first UN troops arrive, and might remain there long after they pull out.

This raises a number of questions to do with the relationship between military forces and civil organisations in situations of conflict.

Increasingly, governments and armed forces are using the word 'humanitarian' to define military action – see the US and British air strikes against targets in Iraq in February 2001, for example, or NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999.

Pressure too is growing for a closer relationship between armed forces and NGOs. The British army, for instance, is increasingly keen on being involved in areas of work traditionally the preserve of civilian agencies. The lines that traditionally divided military and political action from humanitarian action are becoming blurred.

How should agencies respond to questions of civil-military coordination in the field?

There are agencies which accept – even call for – military involvement, and others that categorically do not. In practical terms, agencies may need, or may be compelled to accept, military help in protecting refugees or themselves, or relocating camps.

The military clearly has expertise that could be useful in disarmament and demobilisation programmes.

This is particularly the case for a country like Britain, whose government has defined DDR as an important aspect of its peace-building agenda, and is commissioning extensive research on the subject.

The key question is to do with how Brahimi defines impartiality. For peace operations, it means 'adherence to the principles of the [UN] Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties ... can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil'.

Peacekeeping is, by definition, a political action. Peacekeepers are deployed on the basis of UN resolutions agreed by governments, and can be mandated to take explicitly political action against parties to a conflict – arresting war criminals in the Balkans, for instance. If their presence aims to enforce peace accords, recalcitrants can be coerced into behaving, and amenable parties rewarded for being agreeable.

For humanitarians, impartiality means something quite different: the delivery of assistance on the basis of need alone. In the context of a peacekeeping operation, where do agencies look for the 'humanitarian space' deemed essential if they are to carry out their work? There is a risk that too close a relationship between the peacekeeping mission and the humanitarian operation implicates humanitarians in political action to which elements of the local population are opposed, thereby putting them at risk of retaliation. The nature of modern conflict can suggest a closer relationship between agencies and the military. Again, this is a sensitive issue of principle. In theory, at least, there are areas where some common ground could be found. But to do this successfully would mean the explicit recognition of the very different agendas of aid agencies and peacekeepers and their governments.

By declining to take humanitarian concerns more fully and explicitly into account, Brahimi insulates peacekeeping from the wider context in which it operates, of which humanitarian agencies are an important part. Peacekeeping and humanitarian agendas necessarily differ, and it is important that these differences are kept clear.

58

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Haiti Adv.

AJ: Constabulary Forces Haiti Advantages

PEACEKEEPING WON'T SOLVE - HAITIAN POVERTY IS THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM

BBC, June 2, 2004, p. online

I shared these thoughts in Mexico last week with the Chilean president in particular as well as the Uruguayan president. We were all able to come to acknowledge that, in order to maintain stability in Haiti, it is not enough to think about peacekeeping but that it will also be necessary to attack the root of the problem, which is poverty. And it is by fighting against poverty, by creating jobs and improving the conditions of the people that we shall obtain in the medium and long terms remedies to the instability that prevails in the country. I must acknowledge that it is with sadness that, for the second time in less than 10 years, today we have had to call on UN troops, on foreign troops, to come to help us - ensure a peaceful climate in the country. That is the reason why I think that we all need to mobilize in order to attack the causes of this instability, that is, to fight against poverty.

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN HAITI HAVE FAILED DUE TO LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Stephen Johnson, is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, SECURING A FRESH START IN HAITI, March 10, 2004,
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/EM920.cfm>

To date, U.S. interventions in Haiti have never been successful. The objective has always been to stabilize an unstable nation with a poorly educated populace and no social contract. The means of achieving stability has either been to take over the state or to back a popular leader-temporary fixes at best. If it is in America's interest to become involved this time, the most durable solution will lie between those extremes and will support the development of public institutions and an educated citizenry to maintain them.

59

THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM REALLY SMALL

Dr. J. Ruvalds (Professor of Physics) 7/23/96 <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/RichterCell/nuceml.htm>

Threat
of nuclear
terrorism
really
small

Although the facts above seem to support the conclusion that a terrorist could presently have and use a nuclear weapon, the odds of this happening seem very small. There is no probable way that a terrorist group could afford the price of purchasing uranium or plutonium on its own. Instead, they would have to rely on some nation to buy it for them. However, most nations would rather keep the nuclear supplies for themselves if they spent the large amount of money required to purchase such materials. Even if a terrorist group had the materials necessary for a nuclear weapon, it seems unlikely that they would be able to completely assemble a perfectly working nuclear bomb. Most groups would probably lack the necessary professionals to assemble the weapon.

TERRORISTS DO NOT DEVELOP TRADITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MISHRA 2001 (DR. RAJESH KUMAR; CONSULTANT AND HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF MICROBIOLOGY; "NUCLEAR TERRORISM: POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD." 5/11: <http://www.iaea.org/newsroom/news/2001/0111.htm>)

* Development of either crude or sophisticated nuclear weapon requires necessary infrastructural facilities like technology, components and scientists. Non-state actors or terrorist entities could hardly have such facilities available. The probability remains low of having such tools and techniques available to possible wrong users unless supported by nuclear capable state or agency.

TERRORISTS WON'T GET NUKES

Glenn Zorpette (Senior editor for the Spectrum) July 9th 2004

<http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/nov01/nterr.html>

Fortunately, most terrorist groups are transient, geographically dispersed, and limited in their technical resources, all factors that hardly conduce to building a nuclear bomb. Admittedly, there are shortcuts, such as buying the bomb-grade materials or even an entire weapon on the black market. But those options are somewhat less accessible than they were in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, before the United States and other countries spent hundreds of millions of dollars shoring up Russia's loose and antiquated system of nuclear safeguards.

HIGH LEVEL INTELLIGENCE SHOWS RISKS OF LOOSE NUKES IS EXAGGERATED.

BORGER, JULIAN & MACASKILL, EWEN (PUBLISHERS IN THE GUARDIAN, SUITCASE BOMBS AND OLD SOVIET MATERIAL POSE DANGER TO U.S.)

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,589183,00.html>

2001

Another way to acquire a nuclear weapon is to steal or buy one. There have been numerous unconfirmed reports of ex-Soviet warheads going missing and ending up in the volatile central Asian republics. There have also been rumours of KGB suitcase bombs (whose existence has never been definitively confirmed) being put on the market by Chechen warlords.

However, most experts look sceptically on these stories. Israeli intelligence, which monitors such proliferation closely, has rejected speculation that nuclear weapons have gone missing from the Soviet Union. Brigadier General Yossi Cooperwasser, chief of research for Israel's military intelligence, said: "We've checked out the reports and don't have any evidence to support concerns over lost, stolen or misappropriated nuclear devices."

However, the threat of a "dirty bomb" is serious enough. There is no doubt that this eminently feasible weapon is the most serious terrorist threat facing the US and the rest of the world.